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Abstract
The executive branch, or government, is typically not elected directly
by the people, but rather formed by another elected body or person such as
the parliament or the president. As a result, its members are not directly
accountable to the people, individually or as a group. We consider a
scenario in which the members of the government are elected directly by
the people, and wish to achieve proportionality while doing so.
We propose a formal model consisting of k offices, each with its own
disjoint set of candidates, and a set of voters who provide approval ballots
for all offices. We wish to identify good aggregation rules that assign one
candidate to each office. As using a simple majority vote for each office in-
dependently might result in disregarding minority preferences altogether,
here we consider an adaptation of the greedy variant of Proportional Ap-
proval Voting (GreedyPAV) to our setting, and demonstrate—through
computer-based simulations—how voting for all offices together using this
rule overcomes this weakness. We note that the approach is applicable
also to a party that employs direct democracy, where party members elect
the party’s representatives in a coalition government.
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in which a government in some country has to be populated;
i.e., there should be selected the minister of health, the minister of education,
etc. Usually this assignment process is done via a non-participatory process.
Here we describe a way of doing this process in a participatory way. In essence,
we would like each of the citizens of the country to describe her preferences
regarding the assignment of alternatives to each office.
While the above setting is indeed quite imaginary, as this is not the way it
is usually done in practice, our particular motivation for this work comes from
populating governments in coalitional systems; indeed, in coalitional systems,
following coalition negotiations, each party in the coalition is being allocated
some set of offices that, in turn, has to be populated with ministers. Specifically,
we are interested in the process in which a party that got allocated some offices
through such a negotiation, shall decide internally—via democratic vote of its
members–how to assign ministers to each of her allocated offices.
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We view this process as a social choice setting and first observe that one
natural and simple way to approach it is to view it as k independent elections,
where k is the number of offices allocated to the party. For example, each
voter can select a set of alternatives for each of the offices and, for each office
independently, we can select the alternative that got the highest number of
votes.
Observe, however, that such a process might disregard the preferences of
minorities; in particular, if a strict majority vote for some alternatives for each
of the offices, then only the alternatives voted by the majority would be selected,
and none of the alternatives of the minority would be, even if the minority consist
of 50− ǫ percent of the votes.
To overcome this weakness, we view the setting as a whole, in which we have
one election whose output would be the complete assignment of alternatives to
the full set of k offices, and we aim to find a process that would guarantee some
sort of proportionality.
To this end, we offer an adaptation of the greedy variant of Proportional Ap-
proval Voting (in short, GreedyPAV) to this setting and show – via computer-
based simulations – that indeed, in many cases, it guarantees proportional rep-
resentation to minorities.
2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the specific setting we are considering in this
paper is new. The most related work is that of Conitzer et al. [3], who study
a generalization of our model, using general cardinal utilities and not approval
ballots; moreover, they study different axioms and different rules.
There are some related models studied in the social choice literature, how-
ever, that we mention below.
First, we mention the work of Boehmer et al. [2] that considers an assign-
ment social choice problem, but differs from our model in that voters provide
numerical utilities and alternatives can run for few offices in parallel (so the
output decision shall take into account the suitability of alternatives to offices,
while we derive the suitability directly for the votes).
Generally speaking, our social choice task is of selecting a committee, and
thus is related to the extensive work on committee selection and multiwinner
elections [4]. In our setting, however, we do not aim simply at selecting k
alternatives, but at selecting an assignment to k offices.
Related, the line of work dealing with committee selection with diversity
constraints (e.g., see [5, 1]) has some relation to our work, in particular, as one
can choose a quota of “at most one health minister”, “at most one education
minister”, and so on.
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3 Formal Model
We model our situation as follows: We have a set of k offices and k corresponding
disjoint sets of alternatives, Aj , j ∈ [k] so that each candidate runs for at most
one office). Let us denote the set of all alternatives by A := ∪i∈[k]Aj . Here we
consider the approval setting, so, in particular, we have a set V = {v1, . . . , vn}
of n votes such that v ⊆ A, v ∈ V . Then, an aggregation method for our setting
takes as input such an instance (A, V ) and outputs one alternatives aj ∈ Aj for
each j ∈ [k].
Example 1. Consider the k sets of alternatives being A1 = {a, b}, A2 = {c, d},
and A3 = {e, f, g}, and the set of votes being v1 = {a, c, e}, v2 = {a, c, f},
and v3 = {a, d, f}. An output of an aggregation method might be {a, c, g},
corresponding to alternative a being selected for the first office, alternative c
being selected for the second office, and alternative g being selected for the
third office.
4 The Problem with Independence
Perhaps the most natural and simple solution would be to view the setting
as running k independent elections; for example, selecting to each office the
alternative that got the highest number of approvals. This, however, would be
problematic; in particular it would not be proportional.
Example 2. Consider a society with strict majority voting for aj ∈ Aj for each
j ∈ [k]. Now, disregarding how the other voters vote, aj ∈ Aj , j ∈ [k] would be
selected. In particular, even a minority of 49% would not be represented in the
government.
5 Adapting GreedyPAV
To overcome the difficulty highlighted above, here we aim at identifying a voting
rule for our setting that does not completely disregard minorities.
To this end, here we adapt GreedyPAV. GreedyPAV is used for multiwinner
elections and is known to be proportional for that setting. It works as follows:
Initially, each voter has a weight of 1; the rule works in k iterations (as the task
in standard multiwinner elections is to select a set of k alternatives), where in
each iteration one alternative will be added to the initially-empty committee. In
particular, in each iteration, the alternative with the highest total weight from
voters approving it is selected, and then the weight of all voters who approve
this alternative is reduced; the reduction follows the harmonic series, so that
a voter whose weight is reduced i times will have a weight of 1/(i + 1) (e.g.,
initially the weight is 1; then, a voter reduced once would have a weight of 1/2,
then of 1/3, and so on).
In the proposed adaptation of GreedyPAV to our setting of electing an exec-
utive branch, in each iteration, we again select the alternative with the highest
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weight from approving voters; say this is some aj ∈ Aj . Now, we fix the jth
office to be populated by aj ; then, as it is fixed, we remove all other ai ∈ Aj
from further consideration (as the jth office is already populated) and reweight
approving voters as described above (in the description of GreedyPAV for the
standard setting of multiwinner elections).
Example 3. Consider again the election described in Example 1, consisting of
k sets of alternatives: A1 = {a, b}, A2 = {c, d}, and A3 = {e, f, g}; 3 voters:
v1 = {a, c, e}, v2 = {a, c, f}, and v3 = {a, d, f}.
In the first iteration of GreedyPAV, we will select alternative a to populate
the first office; then we reweight all votes to be 1/2 (as all voters approve a). In
the next iteration we will select either c or f (as both has total weight of 1); say
that our tie-breaking selects c.1 Then, we reweight v1 and v2 to be both 1/3.
In the third and last iteration, alternative e has 1/3 weight, while alternative f
has 1/3 + 1/2 so we select f . Thus, GreedyPAV assigns a to the first office, c
to the second office, and f to the third office.
5.1 The Merits of GreedyPAV
Our main aim is to achieve some sort of proportionality, in that minorities would
not be completely disregarded when populating the offices. Consider first the
following example.
Example 4. Consider a toy society instantiating the general situation presented
in Example 2, with 3 offices and 3 voters, v1, v2, and v3, voting as follows: For
each office i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, v1 votes for ai, while v2 and v3 vote for bi. Note that,
indeed v2 and v3 are a cohesive majority, however GreedyPAV might select b1
for the first office, resulting in reducing the weight of v2 and v3 by half, thus
making sure that at least a2 or a3 would be selected, thus the minority would
also be taken into account.
We ran computer-based simulations to evaluate the extent of such minority
representation. To this end, we generated artificial voter profiles and checked,
for each of them, whether the following property holds, namely: whether it is
the case that, for each group V ′ of n/k voters for which, for each office, there
is at least one alternative approved by all voters of V ′, it holds that there is
at least one office for which the selected alternative is approved by at least one
voter from V ′; we view satisfying this property to mean that the voting rule does
not completely disregard the preferences of big enough and cohesive minorities.
We first generated completely random profiles, in particular, profiles in which
each voter has some probability to approve each of the alternatives. For such
profiles, when we consider, e.g., profiles with 30 voters, 10 offices, and 10 al-
ternatives in each office, we see that, for p ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, where p is the
probability of a voter to approve an alternative, after generating 1000 such ran-
dom profiles, in each of them the property mentioned above is indeed satisfied.
1we omit discussion on tie breaking as it technically clutters the presentation; say that we
do it arbitarily following some predefined order over all alternatives.
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We then generated profiles differently, in particular, we pick a group of n/k
voters, set all of them to approve some randomly-chosen alternative for each
office, and generate all remaining n− n/k voters randomly as described above.
For this distribution of profiles, again, we get 100% satisfaction of the property
described above for 1000 profiles, each with 9 offices with 9 alternatives in each,
and 27 voters, for p ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
While, indeed, there might be profiles for which GreedyPAV does not satisfy
the proportionality property described above, we view this preliminary exper-
imental evaluation as demonstrating that in practice there is reason to believe
that GreedyPAV would indeed not violate the property, thus providing sufficient
representation to big-enough cohesive minorities.
6 Outlook
We have described the setting of selecting the executive branch via direct democ-
racy. For this setting we suggest the use of an adaptation of GreedyPAV and
show, via computer-based simulations, that it indeed does not disregard minori-
ties in many cases.
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